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Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and 
Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment*
ABSTRACT. In this paper, I argue against constructive empiricism that, as far as science is 
concerned, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guidance of cautious 
ontological commitment. My argument is in two stages. First, I argue that constructive 
empiricist choice of observability as a criterion for ontological commitment is based on 
the assumption that belief in the existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable 
because belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation. 
Second, I argue that the kind of ontological commitment that is under consideration 
when accepting a theory is commitment to what I call a theoretical kind and that 
observation can vindicate commitment to kinds only in exceptional cases. 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, constructive empiricism has represented one of the most 
significant and widely discussed alternatives to scientific realism. Constructive 
empiricism has revived the view that scientific theories aim to “save the phenomena”. 
Among the most contentious theses of constructive empiricism is that, in accepting a 
scientific theory, belief should be suspended with regard to the existence of 
unobservable entities that are postulated by the theory. Bas van Fraassen, the main 
advocate of constructive empiricism, argues that belief in the existence of 
unobservable entities ultimately relies on an unwarranted inference to the truth of the 
theory that postulates their existence and, therefore, it is not adequately supported. In 
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this paper, I will argue that, as far as science is concerned, observability is not an 
adequate criterion for ontological commitment.  
In an essay against van Fraassen’s adoption of observability as a criterion for 
ontological commitment, Paul Churchland once wrote: 
[…] our observational ontology is rendered exactly as dubious as our 
nonobservational ontology. This parity should not seem surprising. Our history 
contains real examples of mistaken ontological commitments in both domains. For 
example, we have had occasion to banish phlogiston, caloric and the luminiferous 
ether from our ontology—but we have also had occasion to banish witches and the 
starry sphere that turns about us daily. These latter items were observable as you 
please and were widely ‘observed’ on a daily basis. We are too often misled, I think, 
by our causal use of observes as a success verb: we tend to forget that at any stage of 
our history, the ontology presupposed by our observational judgements remains 
essentially speculative and wholly revisable, however entrenched and familiar it may 
have come (Churchland 1985, p. 36–37). 
This paper attempts to make explicit the reasons why, as far as scientific theories are 
concerned, commitment to what is observable is no less dubious than commitment to 
what is unobservable. Even if witches are observable and electrons are not, I will 
argue, one cannot observe that someone is a witch more than they can observe that 
something is an electron. 
My argument is in two stages. First, in Sections 3 and 4, I argue that the best 
explanation for constructive empiricism selective agnosticism towards the 
unobservable is to assume that constructive empiricists assume that belief in the 
existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable because it cannot be vindicated by 
observation of those entities. Second, in Sections 5–7, I argue that the kind of 
ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a theory is 
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ontological commitment to what I call a theoretical kind and that, even if we granted 
that only observation can vindicate ontological commitment to individual entities, it 
can only vindicate commitment to theoretical kinds in exceptional circumstances. I 
conclude that, by and large, ontological commitment to observable kinds is no safer 
than ontological commitment to unobservable kinds and, therefore, observability is 
not an adequate criterion as guidance to a risk-averse policy in matters of ontological 
commitment. 
2. The Observable/Unobservable Distinction 
In The Scientific Image, van Fraassen famously criticises logical empiricists’ attempts 
to distinguish the terms of scientific theories into observational and theoretical. This 
alleged distinction, claims van Fraassen, stems from the conflation of two questions 
that should remain distinct and should be given opposite answers. The first question is 
whether it is possible to distinguish the terms of a language into theoretical and non-
theoretical; the second is whether it is possible to classify entities (objects, events, 
properties etc.) into observable and unobservable. 
According to van Fraassen, the first question should be answered negatively, for 
“[a]ll of our language is thoroughly theory-infected” (van Fraassen 1980, p.14). On 
the other hand, he believes that it is possible to answer the second question positively. 
Entities can be classified on the basis of their being observable by us or not: 
The term ‘observable’ classifies putative entities (entities which may or may not 
exist). A flying horse is observable—that is why we are so sure that there aren’t 
any—and the number seventeen is not. There is supposed to be a correlate 
classification of human acts: an unaided act of perception, for instance is an 
observation. A calculation of the mass of a particle from the deflection of its 
trajectory in a known force field, is not an observation of that mass (van Fraassen 
1980, p.15). 
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As van Fraassen points out, the observable/unobservable distinction ultimately 
relies on the classification of some human acts as observations. According to him, a 
prototypical act of observation has two distinctive features: it is neither instrumentally 
nor conceptually mediated. Microscopes, cloud chambers, laser interferometers and 
other scientific instruments allow us to detect entities, but detection has to be carefully 
distinguished from observation. A look through a microscope does not allow us to 
observe directly a paramecium; only to observe an image of a paramecium, or to 
detect a paramecium (van Fraassen 2001). The invention of the microscope, therefore, 
has not extended the range of what we can observe. Rather, it has created a number of 
new observable phenomena to be explained: the images that we observe when we 
look through it. Although a few exceptional examples of instrumentally aided acts of 
observation (like observation through spectacles, binoculars, telescopes) can be 
considered clear, though perhaps not prototypical, acts of observation, the 
constructive empiricist regards only observations with the naked eye as prototypical 
acts of observation. 
The second distinctive feature of a prototypical act of observation is that it is not 
conceptually mediated. Van Fraassen expresses this requirement by distinguishing 
between ‘observing’ and ‘observing that’. He remarks: 
It is […] important here not to confuse observing (an entity such as a thing, event, or 
process) and observing that (something or other is the case). Suppose one of the Stone 
Age people recently found in the Philippines is shown a tennis ball or a car crash. From 
his behaviour, we see that he has noticed them; for example, he picks up the ball and 
throws it. But he has not seen that it is a tennis ball, or that some event is a car crash, for 
he does not even have those concepts. He cannot get that information through perception; 
he would have first to learn a great deal (van Fraassen 1980, p.15). 
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The prototypical act of observation does not presuppose that the observer has any 
concept of what the observed object is. Even if the person in the example does not 
possess the concept of tennis ball, he can observe a tennis ball exactly as an 
experienced tennis player would observe it. The prototypical act of observation does 
not presuppose, on the part of the observer, any belief about or any knowledge of 
what the observed entity is. 
A constructive empiricist would probably consider a few exceptional examples of 
conceptually mediated acts of observation clear, though perhaps not prototypical, acts 
of observation. For example, any observer who is presented with a tennis ball does not 
simply observe that there is something or other in front of her, but she also 
presumably observes that it is spherical, yellow and soft to touch. Nevertheless a 
prototypical act of observation does not require more than the mere awareness that 
something or other is present to the senses of the observer. 
The observable/unobservable distinction plays a key role in constructive 
empiricism. According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism, as opposed to 
scientific realism, is defined by two theses. The first thesis is that “[s]cience aims to 
give us theories that are empirically adequate […]” (van Fraassen 1980, p.12) rather 
than true; the second is that “[…] to accept a theory is (for us) to believe that it is 
empirically adequate—that what the theory says about what is observable (by us) is 
true” (van Fraassen 1980, p.18; emphasis in the original). 
Constructive empiricism straightforwardly equates ‘empirically adequate’ with 
‘true about what is observable (by us)’. For the constructive empiricist, the range of 
what is observable by us coincides with the range of what is epistemically accessible 
to us. Hence, what is observable by us somehow determines both what we can 
 5
reasonably expect from a scientific theory and how much belief is involved in its 
acceptance. 
A corollary to the second thesis is that, according to constructive empiricism, 
belief should be withheld with regard to the existence of the unobservable entities that 
are postulated by an accepted scientific theory. In this paper, I will focus on this 
corollary. The decision to withhold belief in the existence of the unobservable entities 
postulated by a theory, I will argue, is based on a misconception of the sort of 
ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a theory. 
3. On the Connection between Observability and Existence 
The different epistemic attitudes that constructive empiricists adopt towards the 
existence of observable and unobservable entities presuppose some sort of connection 
between the observability of an entity and its existence. However, since van Fraassen 
has never explicitly stated what, according to him, the connection between the two 
exactly is, we will need a certain amount of guesswork to determine the nature of this 
connection. 
First of all, van Fraassen explicitly rejects the thesis that the connection between 
observability and existence is of an ontological nature. On the one hand, observability 
does not imply existence. Both existent and non-existent entities can be observable. 
Flying horses are observable (van Fraassen 1980, p.15), but this doesn’t tell us 
anything directly about whether there are any flying horses.1 On the other hand, 
existence does not imply observability. This would amount to assuming that only 
what is observable by us exists, a thesis that van Fraassen rejects right away as “[…] 
too anthropocentric […]” (van Fraassen 1980, p.19). 
The relation between the observability of an entity and its existence is rather an 
epistemological one. It is a relation between the belief in the existence of certain 
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entities and the possibility of observing them. But what is this relation? It is important 
to note that van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism breaks with two prominent 
empiricist traditions on this issue. The first is what I shall call naïve empiricism whose 
adherents, following the example of Doubting Thomas, are sceptical towards what is 
unobserved rather than what is unobservable. For them, only seeing is believing. The 
mere possibility of seeing something is just not enough. The second, more 
sophisticated empiricist tradition is what I shall call holistic empiricism whose 
adherents, following Carnap (1950) and Quine (1951, pp.42–43), consider beliefs in 
the existence of all entities, whether observable or unobservable, on a par from an 
epistemological point of view. According to them, both observable and unobservable 
entities are ultimately posited in an attempt to account for our experiences. Since the 
constructive empiricist breaks with both these traditions, they need to explain on what 
basis it is possible to draw an epistemological distinction between ontological 
commitment to observable and unobservable entities. 
According to the constructive empiricist, unobservable entities, unlike observable 
ones, are beyond our direct epistemic grasp and belief in their existence can only be 
indirectly based on a form of inference, abduction, whose very validity is dubious.2 
Philosophers usually maintain that, if someone arrives at a belief by means of a 
fallacious reasoning or holds it for the wrong reasons, their belief cannot be 
considered rational (see, for instance, Audi 1993). This could lead one to suppose that 
constructive empiricism stigmatises belief in the existence of unobservable entities as 
irrational. 
In fact, van Fraassen explicitly acquits those who believe in the existence of 
unobservable entities from the charge of irrationality: 
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Is it rational to believe in angels or electrons? I construe the term rational, as applied 
to opinion here, as a term of permission, rather than of obligation. To say that you 
are rational in your opinions does not mean that your opinions are rationally 
compelled—that any rational person with the same experiences as yourself would 
have to agree. It is not irrational to ‘go beyond the evidence,’ and belief in angels or 
electrons […] does not ipso facto make one irrational. The constraints or bounds of 
rationality leave much undetermined—rationality is bridled irrationality (van 
Fraassen 1985, p.248; emphasis in the original). 
In his most irenic moments, van Fraassen seems to suggest that the divergence 
between constructive empiricists and their critics is ultimately a divergence in the 
epistemic stances accepted by the two sides of the dispute and that the acceptance of a 
specific stance is only a matter of personal inclination insofar as the stance does not 
lead to beliefs that are logically inconsistent or probabilistically incoherent (van 
Fraassen 2002). Scientific realists are simply less averse towards ontological risk than 
constructive empiricists. If this was the case, however, van Fraassen’s arguments 
against scientific realism would be no more than exercises of rhetoric. Unless proven 
inconsistent or incoherent, scientific realism and constructive empiricism would be on 
equal philosophical footing.3
However, there seems to be a way to reconcile van Fraassen’s claim that 
ontological commitment to unobservable entities is rational with his agnosticism 
towards unobservable entities. Van Fraassen frequently distinguishes between the 
rationality and the reasonableness of an act or a decision: 
Any act or decision can be evaluated in two ways. If we evaluate it beforehand, we 
ask how reasonable it is, and afterward, we ask to what extent it was vindicated. The 
two cannot be the same since the agent cannot have knowledge beforehand of the 
exact outcome and consequences of his action—vindication or the lack thereof lies 
as yet beyond his ken. But there must be a connection, since the point of deciding or 
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acting lies in the outcome (broadly construed). Therefore a minimal criterion for 
reasonableness is that you should not sabotage your possibilities of vindication 
beforehand. (van Fraassen 1989, p.157) 
Van Fraassen also states that “[a] commitment is […] not true or false: The 
confidence exhibited is that it will be vindicated” (van Fraassen 1980, p.13; emphasis 
added). We could thus suppose that ontological commitment to unobservable entities, 
though not irrational, is nevertheless unreasonable. In other words, those who decide 
to believe in the existence unobservable entities “sabotage their possibilities of 
vindication beforehand,” to use van Fraassen’s phrase. 
But why would the decision to believe in unobservable entities be unreasonable? If 
only we assume that belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by the 
observation of the entity in question, it is easy to understand why. If the belief in the 
existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation, then the decision to 
believe in the existence of an unobservable entity is unreasonable. In fact, since, ex 
hypothesis, it will never be possible to observe unobservable entities, it will never be 
possible to vindicate belief in their existence. 
4. Observability, Observation, and Vindication 
Van Fraassen never explicitly claims that belief in the existence of an entity can only 
be vindicated by its observation, even if there is some textual evidence that this is the 
case.4 However, the assumption that constructive empiricists consider belief in the 
existence the unobservable entities unreasonable would account for many aspects of 
constructive empiricism. In particular, it would account for the choice of observability 
rather than actual observation as guidance to ontological commitment. Constructive 
empiricism’s scepticism towards the unobservable is not to be confounded with the 
naïve empiricist’s scepticism towards the unobserved. For the constructive empiricist, 
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it is not unreasonable to believe in the existence of unobserved entities as long as the 
entities in question are observable.  
According to the interpretation defended here, this is because belief in the 
existence of an observable and yet unobserved entity can be either true or false, but 
can be in principle vindicated by the observation of the entity and, according to van 
Fraassen, lack of vindication does not impugn the reasonableness of a belief. So it was 
not unreasonable to believe in the existence of the planets Uranus or Vulcanus before 
their observation because they were observable (remember that observation through 
the telescope amounts to observation according to van Fraassen). However, since 
Vulcanus was never observed, belief in the existence of Vulcanus was never 
vindicated.  
On the other hand, belief in the existence of an unobservable entity can happen to 
be either true or false, but, whatever the case may be, it can never be reasonable, for it 
can never be vindicated by the observation of the entity. Unless we assume that 
constructive empiricists accept the above thesis, it is not clear how they can justify 
their different epistemic attitudes towards unobservable and observable but 
unobserved entities, which differentiate constructive empiricism from much 
traditional empiricism. 
Since van Fraassen has never explicitly subscribed this view, it may be argued all 
this is very speculative. In fact, I may well be wrong about the rationale underlying 
the constructive empiricist’s agnosticism towards the unobservable and I cannot rule 
out that the motivation that underlies the constructive empiricist agnosticism towards 
the unobservable is not the one I am proposing. Nevertheless, though speculative, my 
interpretation is not only plausible but, to my knowledge, also consistent with both the 
letter and the spirit of constructive empiricism. 
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Moreover, most of the alternative motivations that may underlie agnosticism 
toward the unobservable I can think of do not seem to cut to the hearth of the 
problem. For example, as an anonymous referee for this journal has pointed out to me, 
the rationale behind the agnosticism may be that the postulation of the unobservable 
entities is superfluous to account for scientific practice or the success of science. This 
seems to be what van Fraassen thinks (the old story of the sheep and the lamb), but, it 
does not cut to the heart of the problem. In fact, if this was what motivates their 
agnosticism towards the unobservable, constructive empiricist would still have 
explain what justifies the constructive empiricist’s departure from the views of 
empiricists such as Carnap or Quine, according to whom all entities, whether 
observable or unobservable, are ultimately posited to account for our experiences. In 
other words, constructive empiricists would still have to explain why commitment to 
observables and unobservable are on a different epistemic footing, if it is not because, 
unlike holistic empiricist and like naïve empiricists, constructive empiricist think that 
actual observation grants us direct epistemic access to observable entities. 
If I am right, the rationale that underlies the constructive empiricist agnosticism 
towards unobservable entities is their belief in the unreasonableness of belief in the 
unobservable entities. In the rest of this paper, however, I will argue that, even if we 
conceded that belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by the 
observation of that entity, the observation of an entity cannot vindicate the sort of 
ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a scientific 
theory. 
5. Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment 
The debate between van Fraassen and his critics has been based on the unchallenged 
assumption that the sort of ontological commitment that is under consideration when 
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accepting a scientific theory is belief in the existence of individual entities. In this and 
the next sections, I will argue that to close scrutiny this assumption appears to be 
wrong. For the present purposes, it is important to distinguish between three main 
kinds of ontological commitment: ontological commitment to an individual entity, 
ontological commitment to a natural kind, and ontological commitment to a 
theoretical kind. Ontological commitment to a (bare) individual entity amounts to 
belief in the existence of some specific entity or other. In the language of first order 
logic, belief in the existence of an individual can be expressed as ‘∃x(a = x),’ where 
‘a’ is the name of the individual in question. One’s belief in the existence of the Sun 
could be an example of this sort of commitment. Ontological commitment to the Sun 
as an individual entity is belief that there is something rather than nothing before our 
eyes when we look at the Sun and, as such, it does not imply any belief as to what 
kind of entity the Sun is, nor does it imply any belief about what properties the Sun 
has (except, possibly, for the most basic ones). For the sake of the argument, we can 
assume that this sort of commitment is thus largely independent from the theories 
about what the Sun is and that it was shared by Ptolemaic and Copernican 
astronomers as well as by the contemporary astronomers.5
Ontological commitment to a natural kind amounts to the belief that certain entities 
are entities “of the same kind”. If we are to follow Kripke and Putnam’s influential 
account, membership to a natural kind is conditional on the possession of some 
essential properties (cf. Putnam 1973 and Kripke 1980). Ontological commitment to a 
natural kind would therefore amount to the belief that the entities in question (and 
possibly other entities) share some “essential” properties. This sort of commitment, 
however, does not imply any specific belief about what the essential properties are 
(Putnam 1975 p.225), it only implies that the entities in question share some essential 
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properties. In the language of second order logic, this sort of belief could thus be 
expressed as ‘∃X (Xa∧Xb∧Xc∧…¬Xm∧¬Xn∧…),’ where ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are the 
names of individuals that one believes to be members of the kind and ‘m’ and ‘n’ 
names of individuals that one believes not to be members of the kind. 
Two people can be committed to the same individual entities and yet be committed 
to completely different natural kinds, if they do not group those entities in natural 
kinds in the same manner. For example, unlike contemporary astronomers, Ptolemaic 
and Copernican astronomers did not believe that the Sun and the “fixed” stars 
belonged to the same natural kind. They would thus be committed to different natural 
kinds from the ones to which contemporary astronomers are committed, even if we 
assumed that they all believed in the existence of the same individual entities. 
Finally, ontological commitment to a theoretical kind is the belief that there are 
entities that have the properties directly or indirectly attributed to them by a certain 
theory. In the language of first-order logic, this sort of belief would be expressed as 
‘∃x (Px∧Rx∧Qx∧…),’ where ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’ denote the properties and relations that 
the theory implicitly or explicitly attributes to the members of the kind. Ontological 
commitment to one of the various theoretical kinds star implies that there are entities 
that have the properties a certain theory (implicitly or explicitly) ascribes to the stars. 
If two people accept different theories about what properties the members of the kind 
are, they may be both committed to the same individual entities and to the same 
natural kinds and yet be committed to different theoretical kinds. 
Although crucial, the distinction between natural and theoretical kinds is not 
always easy to draw. This is particularly true when the same kind term is used to refer 
to both a natural kind and to a number of corresponding theoretical kinds, as in the 
case of ‘electron’ and ‘star’. However, the two kinds of commitment are crucially 
 13
different. To believe in the existence of the natural kind electron is to believe that, 
say, the entities that make up cathode rays, those that are diffracted in the Low-
Energy Electron Diffraction (LEED) and those that go through electric wires are the 
same kind of entities. To believe in the existence of some theoretical kind electron is 
to believe that there are entities that have the properties that one of the theories about 
the nature of electrons attribute to the electrons. 
6. Ontological Commitment and Theory Acceptance 
Of the three kinds of ontological commitment that I have considered in the previous 
section, ontological commitment to individual entities is completely independent of 
the acceptance of any theory. This sort of commitment is the belief that there is 
something rather than nothing before the eyes of the observer and, for the sake of the 
argument, I will assume that this sort of commitment is completely independent from 
the acceptance of any theory and that it can be vindicated by a non-conceptually 
mediated act of observation of the kind discussed in Section 2. For example, since this 
box rattles when I shake it, I believe that there is something rather than nothing in it. 
If I open the box and I see that there is something inside, my belief that there is 
something in the box is vindicated even if I have no idea about what the object in the 
box is. Analogously, my belief that there is a colourless liquid in the glass can be 
vindicated by the observation of the glass. However, this belief amounts to little more 
than the belief that there is something rather than nothing in the glass, if I do not know 
whether the colourless liquid is water or gin. 
Ontological commitment to individual entities is clearly not the kind of 
commitment that is under consideration when accepting a scientific theory. Theories 
rarely postulate the existence of individual objects. Even when they do, they postulate 
the existence of objects that have certain properties. For examples, something could 
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qualify as the aether postulated by some versions of classical electromagnetic theory 
only if it was, among other things, a massless, incompressible, and non-viscous fluid 
that transmits transverse electromagnetic waves. To believe in the existence of the 
aether postulated by the theory is to believe that, in the world, there is something with 
certain properties—it is to believe in the existence of a certain theoretical kind. 
The situation is more complicated when it comes to ontological commitment to a 
natural kind. On the one hand, ontological commitment to a natural kind often 
precedes the acceptance of any theory about the nature of that kind. On the other 
hand, it is not entirely independent from the acceptance of those theories. The 
acceptance of a certain theory about the nature of a certain kind may lead one to 
revise their beliefs about which entities belong to the kind and which do not. When 
we accept a theory according to which what we call ‘water’ is dihydrogen oxide, for 
example, we might no longer be willing to consider water a sample of liquid that has 
all the observable characteristics of water if it is not a sample of dihydrogen oxide. 
People who accept different theories about the nature of the entities that belong to a 
certain natural kind, however, are still committed to the same natural kind insofar as 
they agree about which entities belong to that kind and which ones do not. However, 
they do not completely agree on what there is in the world if they are committed to 
different theoretical kinds. 
Ontological commitment to a natural kind is the kind of commitment of convergent 
realists a lá Putnam (1982). Convergent realists maintain that terms like ‘electron’ are 
natural kind terms and, as such, they continue to refer to the same entities in spite of 
the change in our theories about electron. The convergent realist’s commitment to 
electrons therefore does not depend on the acceptance of a certain theory about the 
nature of the electron but on the assumption that the term refers and the entities to 
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which it refers are entities “of the same kind”. This is why, according to the 
convergent realist, we would be able to claim that the 19th-century physicists were 
committed to the natural kind electron in exactly the same way as 21st-centrury 
physicists are, despite their different views about the nature of electrons. 
Entity realists such as Hacking (1983) or Cartwright (1983) are also primarily 
committed to the natural kind electron rather than any specific theoretical kind 
electron (this is what Hacking has sometimes called their “debt to Hillary Putnam”). 
They accept that there are electrons in the sense that they accept that the entities that 
we manipulate in a number of different circumstances are entities of the same kind. 
However, they do not necessarily believe that there are entities that have all the 
properties that any of our current theories attribute to electrons—i.e. they are not 
committed to any specific theoretical kind electron. Their belief in the existence of the 
natural kind of electrons does not depend on their belief in the truth of any of the 
theories that postulate the existence of electrons, it depends on their belief that the 
entities with which we interact in a number of different contexts are entities of the 
same kind. As such, their ontological commitment to electrons can survive theory 
change.  
Even if we were to assume that commitment to a natural kind depends to some 
extent on the acceptance of a certain theory, however, this kind of commitment cannot 
be vindicated by an act of observation, let alone a non-conceptually mediated one, as 
it is not observable that something is a member of a certain natural kind. As Kripke 
and Putnam have repeatedly argued, on the one hand, something can have all the 
observable properties that characterise a certain kind and not be a member of the kind 
and, on the other hand, something can be a member of the kind and have none of the 
observable properties that characterise the kind. If they are right, then, whether the 
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alleged members of the kind are observable or not, one’s ontological commitment to a 
certain kind cannot be vindicated by the observation of its alleged member as it is not 
observable that the alleged members are actually members of the kind. The 
observation of samples of colourless, odourless, and tasteless liquid cannot vindicate 
our belief in the theoretical kind water, as the samples could be actually samples of 
different substances (say, H2O and Putnam’s XYZ). 
If the first two kinds of commitment are largely independent of the acceptance of a 
theory, then, what is under consideration when accepting a scientific theory is, thus, 
mainly the third kind of ontological commitment—i.e. ontological commitment to a 
theoretical kind. Sometimes, as in the case of water and dihydrogen oxide, a theory 
postulates that a certain natural kind to which one is already committed is identical 
with a certain theoretical kind—i.e. that the all the members of the natural kind have 
certain properties. Other times, as in the case of dark matter, the theory postulates the 
existence of a kind that does not correspond to any natural kind to which we are 
already committed. Whatever the case may be, in accepting that theory we have to 
decide whether to commit ourselves to the theoretical kinds of the theory and, if so, to 
what extent. 
In the previous section, I have loosely characterised ontological commitment to a 
natural kind as the belief that there are entities that have the characteristics attributed 
to them by the theory. However, it is worth distinguishing between unqualified and 
qualified ontological commitment to a theoretical kind. Unqualified ontological 
commitment to a theoretical kind is the belief that there are entities that have all the 
characteristics that the theory attributes to the kind. Today, most scientific realists, 
rendered cautious by the pessimistic meta-induction, would probably be reluctant to 
declare their unqualified committed to a theoretical kind. When they are committed to 
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a certain theoretical kind rather than a natural kind, their commitment is usually 
qualified. Qualified ontological commitment to a theoretical kind is the belief that 
there are entities that have the “core” properties attributed to them by the theory. 
Realists of different stripes disagree as to which of the properties attributed to the kind 
by a theory one need to be realist about, however it seems that, in order to count as 
commitment to a certain theoretical kind, one has to believe that there are entities that 
have the most important properties that are attributed to the kind. Minimally, this 
seems to involve that the members of the kind have causally relevant properties 
attributed to them by the theory, which is the extent to which most entity realists are 
committed to theoretical kinds. Anything less than this can hardly be considered 
commitment to a certain theoretical kind. 
Now, constructive empiricism urges its followers to avoid commitment to a certain 
theoretical kind if the kind is a kind of unobservable entities. If my interpretation of in 
Sections 3 and 4 is correct, this is because commitment to the unobservable 
theoretical kinds is unreasonable, as it cannot be vindicated by the observation of the 
entities that belong to the kind. The problem however is that the observation of a 
certain entity cannot vindicate unqualified ontological commitment to a theoretical 
kind either, unless all of the properties that the theory attributes to the kind are 
themselves observable. In other words, observation of an entity can vindicate 
unqualified belief in the existence of a theoretical kind of entities, whether observable 
or unobservable, only if it is observable that the entity belongs to that kind. 
Let me illustrate this point with one of Chuchland’s examples in the above 
quotation. Suppose that we are back in the 17th century when demonology was 
considered a scientific theory and many scientists accepted it as such.6 Demonology 
postulated the existence of witches: people, mostly women, who, among other things, 
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were endowed by the devil with magical powers. Since witches are observable, a 
constructive empiricist who accepted demonology would not seem to have any 
reservations in believing in the existence of witches.7
The obvious problem is that the alleged observation of (someone who the observer 
believes to be) a witch does not and cannot vindicate the observer’s unqualified 
ontological commitment to the theoretical kind witch. In fact, whereas a witch is 
observable, it is not observable that someone is a witch. To be a member of the 
theoretical kind witch, someone would have to exemplify all the properties that 
demonology attributes to witches, which include having magical powers and having 
received them from the devil. However, since some of these properties are not 
observable, whether or not someone is a witch is not observable either.  
When we deny that witches have been observed, we do not necessarily deny that 
some person or other was in front of the observer (even if sometimes we may even 
deny that much). What we deny is that the person in front of the observer is actually a 
witch—i.e. had the properties that the theory attributes to witches. In other words, in 
order for an act of observation to vindicate unqualified ontological commitment to 
witches, the observer should be able to observe that someone is a witch, but whereas 
witches are observable we cannot observe that someone is a witch. 
In general, unqualified ontological commitment to a theoretical kind can be 
vindicated by the observation of a member of the kind only if all the properties that 
characterise the kind. But this is not usually possible, because the overwhelming 
majority of the theoretical kinds postulated by modern scientific theories are 
characterised by properties that are not observable (in the constructive empiricist 
construal of the term). Unqualified ontological commitment to an observable 
theoretical kind is not necessarily more reasonable than ontological commitment to an 
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unobservable theoretical kind, since in a vast majority of cases neither can be 
vindicated by an act of observation. 
7. Four Possible Ways Out? 
There seems to be four different strategies to avoid the above difficulty: 
(1) Constructive empiricists should only believe in the existence of entities that have 
only the observable properties attributed from the theory to the kind. 
(2) Constructive empiricists should only believe in the existence of observable 
theoretical kinds whose only properties are observable properties. 
(3) Constructive empiricists should only be ontologically committed to observable 
natural kinds. 
(4) Constructive empiricists should only be committed to observable individual 
entities. 
According to (1), a constructive empiricist’s belief in the existence of witches 
would amount to the belief that there are entities that have all and only the observable 
properties that demonology attributes to witches. Commitment to the observable kind 
witch would thus be reasonable, as it could be vindicated by an act of observation. 
The problem, however, is that to believe in the existence of a theoretical kind is, at 
least, to believe that there are entities that have at least the “core” properties that the 
theory attributes to the kind, whether observable or unobservable. In the case of the 
theoretical kind witch, for example, these properties seem to include at least the 
property of having magical powers. It does not seem possible to be committed to the 
theoretical kind witch postulated by demonology without being committed to the 
existence of people who have magical powers. 
People who believe in the existence of entities that have only the observable 
properties that demonology attributes to witches simply do not believe in witches. For 
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example, historians today usually believe that people who were accused of witchcraft 
actually had the observable properties that demonology attributed to witches, but this 
does not mean that they are qualifiedly committed to the theoretical kind witch. For 
example, suppose that an old woman was accused of having caused the death of her 
neighbour by cursing him (as it often used to happen). Usually, the historian would 
neither doubt that the woman did not direct cursing words at her neighbour; nor would 
they deny that the neighbour actually died. What the historian would usually question 
is that there is the curse caused the death of the neighbour in virtue of the magic 
powers that the woman received from the devil. 
Even if it is possible to be committed to a theoretical kind in a qualified manner, it 
seems that constructive empiricist’s commitment to the theoretical kind witch is way 
too thin to count as commitment to the kind witch at all. To replicate the structure of 
one of van Fraassen’s arguments in defence of the observable/unobservable 
distinction, though the difference between the belief that there are entities that have 
most of the properties attributed to witches by demonology and the belief that there 
are entities that have only the observable properties the properties attributed to 
witches by demonology is only a matter of degree, the former is a case of 
commitment to the kind witch; the latter is not. 
Consider now (2). By adopting this strategy, the constructive empiricist can 
actually avoid being committed to witches. As I have already noted, whereas witches 
are observable, not all properties demonology attributes to witches are. The problem 
with this strategy is that modern scientific theories rarely postulate the existence of 
kinds that are exclusively attributed properties that are observable in the constructive 
empiricist’s strict construal of ‘observable’. Planets, for example, are attributed 
among other properties, that of orbiting in elliptical orbits around a central star. This 
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property, which, in the ordinary sense of ‘observable’, would seem to be an 
observable property, does not count as observable in the constructive empiricist sense. 
In fact, the shape of the orbit of a planet is not observable in the constructive 
empiricist sense. Not only it takes numerous observations of the relative position of 
the planet in the sky at different times to discover that the orbit of the planet is 
elliptical, but those observations, by themselves, are compatible with different kinds 
of orbits (such as those in the geocentric systems of epicycles and deferents of 
Ptolemaic astronomy). 
This strategy succeeds in avoiding commitment to non-existent kinds only at the 
price of avoiding commitment to almost any theoretical kind postulated by modern 
scientific theories. If they were to adopt this strategy, constructive empiricists cannot 
be even ontologically committed to the theoretical kind planet, which would seem to 
be above suspicion. I would think that even someone as averse to ontological risk as 
the constructive empiricist is likely to concede that blind fear of ontological 
commitment to most theoretical kinds including seemingly innocuous theoretical 
kinds such as planet is excessive. 
According to (3), the constructive empiricist should only be committed to 
observable natural kinds. This would allow the constructive empiricist to remain non-
committal as to the properties that are common to the kind. The problem is that 
ontological commitment to the natural kind witch does not seem to be more 
reasonable than ontological commitment to the theoretical kind witch. As I have 
already argued above, ontological commitment to a natural kind cannot be usually 
vindicated by an act of observation, as the “essential” properties are (usually?) not 
observable properties. 
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According to (4), constructive empiricist should avoid ontological commitment to 
kinds altogether and only believe in the existence of individual entities. Constructive 
empiricist would therefore believe in the existence of observable objects, such the tree 
in front of my window, the mouse in the wainscoting, Venus and the moons of 
Jupiter, but they would not believe that there are stars or planets more than they 
believe that there are electrons or neutrinos. If this was the case, in accepting a theory, 
constructive empiricists would simply avoid any sort of ontological commitment at 
all. As I have argued above, theories rarely postulate the existence of individual 
entities and, even when they do, the belief in the existence of these entities cannot be 
vindicated by a non-conceptually mediated act of observation. 
8. Conclusions 
In conflating commitment to individual entities and commitment to kinds, 
constructive empiricists fail to see how commitment to observable kinds can be 
unreasonable even if the entities that allegedly belong to the kind are observable as in 
the case of witches. The fact that belief in the existence of witches is not vindicated 
by the numerous reported “observations” of witches does not depend on the fact that 
no entity was actually observed, but on the fact that it is not possible to observe that 
someone is a witch. 
Ontological commitment to kinds is more complicated than brute ontological 
commitment to individuals. In order to vindicate, one’s ontological commitment to a 
kind by means of an act of observation, one should be able to observe that a certain 
entity belongs to the kind and, in the case of unqualified commitment to a theoretical 
kind, this can only happen when all the properties that are attributed to the kind are 
observable, which in modern science seems rarely, if ever, the case. Contrary to what 
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constructive empiricists seem to assume, belief in observable kinds does not seem to 
be necessarily more reasonable than belief in unobservable ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes
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1 It is worth noting that defending the thesis that flying horses are observable might be a problem 
for constructive empiricists. As James Ladyman (2000) has pointed out, van Fraassen’s use of the 
notion of observability seems to be incompatible with his modal antirealism (see also (Monton and van 
Fraassen 2003) and (Ladyman 2004)). How can one determine whether unicorns are observable, if no 
unicorns have been actually observed and counterfactual statements have no objective truth-value? I 
believe this to be a substantive problem for constructive empiricism but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss it. Here I am not concerned with the internal consistency of van Fraassen’s philosophy. 
I am only concerned with the tenability of his agnosticism towards the unobservable. 
2 According to van Fraassen (1980, 1989), belief in the existence of unobservable entities can only 
be ultimately based on a form of inference to the best explanation from the explanatory success of the 
theory that postulates those entities to the truth of the theory. Van Fraassen argues that inference to the 
best explanation is an unwarranted form of inference and, therefore, belief in the existence of 
unobservable entities is always unwarranted (see in particular (van Fraassen 1989)). Apologists of 
inference to the best explanation have repeatedly tried to defuse van Fraassen’s arguments against this 
form of inference (e.g.: (Psillos 1996)). It is far beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether 
inference to the best explanation is an allowable form of inference or not. For the sake of the argument, 
I will grant van Fraassen that the inference from the explanatory power of a theory to its truth is 
unwarranted. 
3 Moreover, van Fraassen would seem to deny that constructive empiricism and scientific realism 
are stances (van Fraassen 2004, p.171).(I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for 
bringing this passage to my attention.) 
4 For example, van Fraassen states: “A flying horse is observable – this is why we are so sure that 
there aren’t any […]” (van Fraassen 1980, p.15; emphasis added). This claim is unexplainable unless 
we assume that the lack of observation of flying horses vindicates the belief in their non-existence. 
5 It is worth noting, however, that this assumption is far from uncontroversial among empiricists. As 
I have already noted, “holistic” empiricists such as Carnap and Quine would deny this and claim that 
the existence of an observable individual entities is no less posited than the existence of unobservable 
ones. 
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6 On the scientific status of demonology, see, for example, (Clark 1984). Those who accepted 
demonology and believed in the existence of witches in the second half of the 17th century included 
Robert Boyle as well as many members of the Royal Society of London. From the point of view of the 
present discussion, it is interesting to note these scientists believed that it was a matter of empirical 
inquiry to discover whether or not witches existed (Olsson 1992). 
7 Of course, witches are observable in the same sense in which unicorns are observable and van 
Fraassen himself says that unicorns are observable (van Fraassen 1980, p.15). 
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